y: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control...
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y: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control...
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In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state.
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Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions.
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Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool...
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Elinor Ostrom's book examines the management of common-pool resources (CPRs) and proposes a third approach beyond centralized control and privatization: the design of durable cooperative institutions led by resource users.
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A book that explores the diversity of solutions for common pool resource problems, based on empirical data and institutional analysis. The author, Elinor Ostrom, won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her work on this topic.
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A tribute to the Nobel Laureate political scientist who challenged the conventional wisdom on common pool resources management. She developed alternative models and empirical studies to explore the diversity of solutions beyond states and markets.
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A book that explores the diversity of solutions for common-pool resource problems, challenging the state and market models. It provides empirical data, theoretical analysis and institutional alternatives to the "tragedy of the commons" argument.
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After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.
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Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state.
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